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REFLECTION ON SHALE GAS FRACKING RISK
ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES
Yosra Abid*
11 WASH. J. ENV’T. L. & POL’Y 1 (2020)
ABSTRACT
Hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, is the current technology of choice
for developing most shale gas reserves. This technology allows increased
production of natural gas from formerly inaccessible shale formations.
One of the primary environmental impacts of concern for fracking is its
potential to contaminate water.
This paper focuses on the potential risks affecting the drinking-water
resources throughout the complete lifecycle of a drilled and fractured
well. Given the significant environmental concerns, fracking risk
assessment (what we know about the risk), and fracking risk
management (what we wish to do about the risk) appear to be
indispensable steps for the enactment of any environmental statute or
regulation addressing such high-stake environmental problems and
public concerns.
The federal government currently exempts most fracking activities
from regulation, and therefore, states remain free to regulate practices as
they see fit. This has resulted in a patchwork of state regulations, where
*
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each state enacts various requirements for wastewater disposal,
underground injection, water supply acquisition, drilling, casing, and
operating wells. The various state fracking regulations fall along a
spectrum from outright statewide bans to laissez-faire approaches. This
paper includes a comparative analysis of state fracking regulations in
three states in the United States: New York, Texas, and Illinois.
Having demonstrated the shortcomings of the current state-centric
system regulating the shale gas fracking, the present paper advances
forward both structural and substantive changes to enhance fracking risk
assessment and management in the U.S.
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INTRODUCTION
While the United States’ demand for natural gas is rising1 and its
production of conventional natural gas is decreasing,2 the temptation of
applying a breakthrough technology allowing access to trillions of cubic
feet of shale gas3 appears understandably irresistible.4 A technological
innovation turned the United States from a net importer of natural gas
only a decade ago into the world’s third largest liquefied natural gas
exporter and the world’s largest natural gas producer.5 This technological
innovation consists of a combination of extraction techniques for
unconventional natural gas (or shale gas), namely the hydraulic

1

“US gas demand has been steadily rising from 1980s… in 2009, the EIA Annual Energy
outlook predicted that natural gas demand in the United States could reach 24.36 Tcf by
the year 2030,” Fang-Yu Liang, Marta Ryvak, Sara Sayeed, and Nich Zhao, The role of
natural gas as a primary fuel in the near future, including comparisons acquisition,
transmission and waste handling costs of as with competitive alternatives, NCBI (April
23, 2012), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3332260/.
2
“Conventional natural gas production in the United States has fallen over the past
decade by about 14 billion cubic feet per day.” QER Report: Energy Transmission,
Storage and Distribution Infrastructure U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 7 (2015),
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/09/f26/QER_AppendixB_NaturalGas.pdf.
3
There are over 827 tcf of recoverable shale gas reserves in the US. Shale Gas: Applying
to Solve America’s Energy Challenges, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 4 (2011),
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=8711.
4
“[…] the shale gas production in the United States has grown more than tenfold from
2.7 BCf/d in January 2004 to about 35.0 Bcf/d in May 2014 […] shale gas accounts for
about half of overall gas production in the Unites States,” see QER Report: Energy
Transmission, Storage and Distribution Infrastructure, supra note 2, at 7.
5
David B. Spence, Responsible Shale Gas Production: Moral Outrage vs. Cool Analysis,
25 FORDHAM ENV’T. L. REV. 141, 141 (2013).; “Enabled by new technology, especially
the combination of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, in the US natural gas
industry has undergone unprecedented changes over the past 8 years,” see also QER
Report, supra note 2, at 6; “Less than a decade ago, with natural production on the
decline, the United States was expected to become a major importer of liquefied natural
gas (LNG) and a last resort market for surplus cargos around the world. But today, thanks
to an increase in shale gas output, the United States is poised to become a significant
supplier of gas to international markets,” Lisa Viscidi, Carlos Sucre & Sean Karst,
Natural Gas Market Outlook: How Latin America and the Caribbean Can Benefit from
the US Shale Boom, THE DIALOGUE: LEADERSHIP FOR THE AMERICAS, 1 (2015); The US is
the current third largest exporter of LNG. Elizabeth Caldwell, Report: The United States
will be The World’s Top LNG exporter in the Next Five Years, Energy in Depth (2019),
https://www.energyindepth.org/report-the-united-states-will-be-the-worlds-top-lngexporter-in-the-next-five-years/; The US is the largest producer of natural gas thanks to
shale gas production: “The United States surpassed Russia in 2011 to become the world’s
largest producer of natural gas […],” U.S. Energy Info. Admin., The US Leads Global
Petroleum and Natural Gas Production with Record Growth in 2018 (2019),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=40973.
3
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fracturing technique (also commonly known as fracking) and the
horizontal drilling technique.6
Fracking is currently the most commonly used technology for the
development of shale gas reserves.7 This technology has allowed the
growing output of natural gas from otherwise unreachable shale
formations.8 To let trapped natural gas out, artificial fractures need to be
created. To this end, wells are pumped down with highly pressurized
water, tracers, chemical additives, and proppants.9
For the purposes of this paper, fracking refers to the whole process
allowing the extraction of natural gas from an unconventional formation.
This process consists of three-fold stages: 1) exploration, 2) extraction
operations, and 3) disposal of the operations-generated wastes.10 First, at
the exploration stage, there should be tests conducted to determine the
existence of natural gas in a given site.11 Second, after obtaining requisite
drilling permits, if any, the operator starts the construction of the well
site and begins drilling.12 Drilling, in unconventional formations, reaches
thousands of feet vertically before it continues horizontally.13 This means
that fracking drills not only occur beneath the conventional gas reserves,
but also, more likely than not, below underground drinking-water
supplies.14 Drilling operations cause natural water, known as “produced
water,” in addition to drilling mud to rise in significant quantities from
the formation through the well to the surface.15 Next, the operator injects
millions of gallons of water at high pressure along with chemicals and
proppants into the well to hydraulically fracture the formation.16 The use
of pressure is essential for the creation of perforations in the well,
allowing chemicals and proppants to penetrate the rock.17 The following
stage consists in storing the water and chemicals, which return through
the well to the surface, and are referred to as “flow-back water.” Placed
6

D. Spence, supra note 5, at 147-8.
James W Adams, Craig D. Stocker & Nicholas R. Lawson, Emerging Centrifugal
Technology in Shale Hydraulic Fracturing Waste Management: A U.S. –France-China
Selected Environmental Comparative Analysis, 34 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 561, 562 (2012).
8
D. Spence, supra note 5, at 141.
9
Joanne Hawkins, Fracking: Minding the Gaps, 17 ENV’T. L. REV. 8, 9 (2015).
10
Michael Burger, The (Re)Federalization of Fracking Regulation, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV.
1483, 1492 (2013).
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id; see also Michael N. Mills & Robin B. Seifried, What is Fracking Wastewater and
How Should We Manage it, 28 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 9, 10–11 (2014).
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 1493.
7
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in a pit or tank, flow-back water will then be disposed of or reused.18 The
operator generally opts for one of three methods to dispose of the
wastewater resulting from the fracking operations: 1) either through
underground injection into a separate disposal well, 2) through discharge
into a water treatment plant, or 3) through land application.19 The final
stage of shale gas extraction consists of plugging and abandoning the
well at the end of its life.20
The various stages of this process give rise to numerous risks,
notably risks for “air pollution,” water contamination, “hazardous waste
spills,” toxic chemical leaks, and increasing greenhouse emissions at the
site of extraction.21 The various stages of the process, notably the
transport, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste and toxic chemicals,
are likely to cause toxic chemicals to spread to underground water
supplies through surface and subsurface channels.22
The most contentious phase of the shale gas extraction is drilling
wastewater management.23 This concern primarily reflects pollution risks
such as methane gas leaks, fluid migration through created fractures into
the groundwater, and surface spills from deficiently constructed wells.24
Additionally, it is of particular concern the volume of water used for
purposes of fracking.25 For instance, Barnette Shale26 wells use four to

18

Id.
M. Mills & R. Seifried, supra note 14, at 9-10.
20
M. Burger, see supra note 10, at 1493.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
see generally M. Mills & R. Seifried, supra note 14.
24
J. Hawkins, see supra note 9, at 10.
25
The supply of freshwater required is approximately 15,000 m3 during the entire
fracturing process into a well, see J. Hawkins, supra note 9, at 11.
26
“The Barnette shale is a geological formation and rich source of natural gas located in
the Fort Worth Basin in Northeast Texas. The shale consists of sedimentary rock made of
clay and quartz and spans 5,000 square miles, beneath about 18 North Texas counties. The
productive portion of the rock formation is located directly beneath Johnson, Tarrant and
western Dallas counties, about a mile and a half underground. The shale contains an
estimated 40 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, making it the largest onshore natural gas field
in Texas and potentially in the United States.” What is the Barnett Shale?, STATE IMPACT:
TEXAS (Aug. 24, 2020), https://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/tag/barnett-shale/.
19

5
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five million gallons of fresh water per well, and Eagle Ford27 wells use
close to thirteen million gallons per well.28
That said, this paper focuses on the potential risks affecting the
drinking-water resources throughout the complete lifecycle of a drilled
and fractured well. On-site storage and disposal of fracking wastewater
pose contamination risk to both ground water and surface water, the two
sources of drinking water.29 Ground water is “water located beneath the
earth’s surface, such as an aquifer, and surface water is water exposed to
the atmosphere such as lakes, rivers, and ponds.”30 Consequently, this
paper identifies the potential threats to water resources, including
contamination from chemical spills, improper fracking wastewater
storage and disposal, in addition to methane releases during the drilling
and fracturing stages.
Given the significant environmental concerns, the fracking risk
assessment (what we know about the risk) and the fracking risk
management (“what we plan to do about the risk”) appear to be
indispensable steps for the enactment of any environmental statute or
regulation addressing such scale of environmental problems and public
concerns.31 The primary objective of risk assessment is “to estimate the
likelihood and the severity of harm to human health and the environment
occurring from exposure to a risk agent.”32 Risk management is defined
as “the process by which the risk assessment is used with other
information to make regulatory decisions.”33
Fracking-related risk assessment has therefore been presented as the
underlying driving force for legislative and regulatory actions at the

27

“The Eagle Ford Shale is a hydrocarbon-producing geological of significant importance
to its capabilities of producing both natural and also oil than other traditional shale plays.
The shale play trends across Texas from the Mexican border into the East Texas, roughly
50 miles wide and 400 miles long with an average thickness of 250 feet with Railroad
Commission of Texas Districts 1-6.” Eagle Ford Shale Information: What is the Eagle
Ford Shale?, LEADING TEXAS ENERGY (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.rrc.state.tx.us/oilgas/major-oil-and-gas-formations/eagle-ford-shale-information/.
28
Rebecca Jo Reser, State and Federal Statutory and Regulatory Treatment of Hydraulic
Fracturing, 80 DEF. COUNSEL J. 90, 92 (2013).
29
Kirbie Watson, The Emperor’s New Clothes: Fracking Legislation in Texas, 3 LSU J.
ENERGY L. & RESOURCES 351, 355 (2014).
30
Id.
31
See Dorothy E. Patton, The ABCs of Risk Assessment, 19 EPA J. 10, 10–11 (1993).
32
John J. Cohrssen & Vincent T. Covello, Risk Analysis: A Guide to Principles and
Methods for Analyzing Health and Environmental Risks U.S. COUNCIL ON ENV. QUALITY,
55 (1989).
33
D. Patton, supra note 32, at 11.
6
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federal and state levels.34 Risk assessment is, in fact, a vital decisionmaking and priority-identifying instrument in environmental
regulations.35 Policymakers therefore aim to achieve credibility and
objectivity for preconceived policy goals by basing legislative and
regulatory choices on risk assessment findings and outcomes.36
That said, the present paper will be structured in three main parts: the
first part generally addresses (I) fracking risk assessment and
management; the second part examines (II) fracking risk assessment and
management at the Federal and State levels; while the third part lays
down a number of (III) suggestions addressing the current regulatory
shortcomings associated with fracking activities.
I.

FRACKING RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT

Risk assessment and management are enshrined in legislative and
regulatory texts governing fracking operations.
A.

Risk Assessment

The primary objective of the risk assessment is “to estimate the
likelihood and the severity of harm to human health and the environment
occurring from exposure to a risk agent.”37 The National Academy of
Sciences (NAS) and EPA risk assessment guidelines define risk
assessment as “the process by which scientific data are analyzed to
describe the form, dimension, and characteristics of risk–that is, the
likelihood of harm to humans or the environment.”38 The risk assessment
process comprises four main phases: “1) hazard identification, 2) dose-

34

According to H. Wiseman, where there is risk there must be regulation. Thus,
regulating depends in large part on the outcome of the risk assessment process. In this
respect Wiseman states “The absence of regulation is not of great concern if fracking is a
relatively benign practice that can be sufficiently controlled through the general
permitting process; but if fracking has significant environmental and public health
impacts, the lack of regulation is problematic.” Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The
Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas Production and the Need for Revisit
Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENV’T. L. REV. 115, 116 (2009).
35
Bernard D. Goldstein, If Risk Management is Broke, Why Fix Risk Assessment, 19 EPA
J. 37, 37 (1993); see also discussion about the various studies conducted to determine the
potential fracking threats on the environment, D. Spence, supra note 5.
36
Id.
37
Cohrssen, see supra note 32, at 55.
38
Dorothy E. Patton see supra note 32, at 11.
7
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response relationship, 3) exposure analysis, and 4) risk
characterization.”39
After examining (1) fracking risk assessment shortcomings, it seems
relevant to identify a wide range of (2) assessed risks associated with
fracking operations.
1. Fracking risk assessment shortcomings
Risk assessment relating to fracking activities can be (a) uncertain
and controversial, (b) manipulated to serve narrow policy goals, and (c)
conducted in an environment of scarce data.
a. Risk assessment inherent limitations: uncertainty and
controversy
It is rare that there is only one answer to an environmental risk
assessment question.40 This can be illustrated by the controversial risk
assessment studies undertaken in connection with the shale gas
development.41
A 2004 EPA study reached the conclusion that fracking “pose[s]
little or no threat” to drinking resources.42 This study was not only
criticized (as it will be further detailed below) for potential political
interference, but also for being inconsistent with previously and
subsequently conducted studies by the EPA.43 In fact, the 2004 EPA
study contradicted a 1987 EPA report which revealed the contamination
of an underground drinking water source in West Virginia’s shale gas

39
Donald W. Stever, The Use of Risk Assessment in Environmental Law, 14 COLUM. J.
ENV’T. L. 329, 329 (1989).
40
“[…] risk assessment means different things to different people – a point that comes
across in subsequent articles in this issue of EPA Journal – and is thus a source of
misunderstanding and controversy. Some points of controversy involve the interpretation
of scientific studies. Others have to do with science policy issues. […]” see D. Patton,
supra note 32, at 11.
41
D. Spence see supra note 5, at 160–62.
42
See EPA, EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER
BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS (2004); see also EPA
Finding on Hydraulic Fracturing Deemed ‘Unsupportable’, UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS, (Aug. 24, 2020, 4:01 PM), https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/epa-findingshydraulic-fracturing-deemed-unsupportable.
43
Id.; “...in 2011, the EPA concluded that fracturing fluids had contaminated a drinking
water aquifer near the town of Pavilion, Wyoming, though the industry disputes that
conclusion,” see D. Spence, supra note 5, at 160–61.

8
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formation.44 Another EPA study, concluded in 2016, found that fracking
can contaminate underground drinking water.45
A 2011 study, conducted at Cornell University, “found a higher
incidence of methane contamination in drinking-water wells located
close to natural gas wells.”46 In 2012, with the goal of quantifying the
risks relating to groundwater contamination, researchers at the State
University of New York enumerated a variety of accidents that “could
result in a spill, and extrapolat[ed] from those probabilities to produce
projected volumes of fracking wastewater that might find their way into
groundwater or surface waters in the Marcellus Shale.”47 The results of
the study show that risks are substantial.48
Notwithstanding the aforementioned studies, a 2011 study conducted
at Pennsylvania State University showed “no significant increase in well
contamination from either methane or fracking fluid constituents” after
gathering samples of drinking water wells “before and after nearby
fracking operations,”49 On the other hand, in a study known as the “Duke
Study,” MIT researchers have come to more nuanced conclusions. After
sampling well water before and after fracking, MIT researchers found
“no evidence of groundwater contamination by fracking fluids or
wastewater,” but highlighted that “levels of thermogenic methane were
higher in shallow groundwater aquifers near natural gas production wells
than elsewhere in the same aquifers.”50 It is worth mentioning that the
researchers did not come up with an explanation as to the presence of gas
drilling in said aquifers.51 Additionally, after comparing “concentrations
of methane and other constituents in 127 water wells in the Fayetteville
shale gas production region before and after shale gas production
operations,” the US Geological Survey, similarly to the above-mentioned
MIT Study and Pennsylvania State University study, reached the
44

M. Burger, see supra note 10, at 1519.
EPA, HYDRAULIC FRACKING FOR OIL AND GAS: IMPACTS FROM THE HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING WATER CYCLE ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2016), available at
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201612/documents/hfdwa_executive_summary.pdf; see also U.S. EPA. HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING FOR OIL AND GAS: IMPACTS FROM THE HYDRAULIC FRACTURING WATER
CYCLE ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES (FINAL REPORT). U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, WASHINGTON, DC, EPA/600/R-16/236F, 2016,
available at https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/hfstudy/recordisplay.cfm?deid=332990.
46
D. Spence see supra note 5, at 161.
47
Id. at 162.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 161.
50
Id. at 161–162.
51
Id. at 162.
45

9
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conclusion that there was “no evidence of contamination of either
methane or fracking fluid constituents [in] wells.”52
b. Risk assessment neutrality can be compromised
Should the risk assessment be considered distinctly from risk
management? Put differently, should we allow politics to influence risk
assessment?
The 1983 Red Book report by the National Academy of Science’s
(NAS) recommended distinguishing risk assessment and risk
management.53
The NAS report further stressed that both the scientific and political
domains significantly influence the risk management process.54 This
exemplifies how risk assessment “operates in the ambiguous borderland
between systematic observations of the physical world (“science”) and
politically accountable decisions about public health and welfare
(“policy”).”55
Criticisms addressed to related risk assessment studies illustrate the
alarming undue influence of politics and industry on these studies’
findings. By way of illustration, authors of an earlier published study,
refuting fracking operations’ impact on methane level in drinking water,
had financial ties to Chesapeake Energy, a company which owns
unconventional oil and natural gas assets in top US onshore plays.56
Furthermore, the accuracy of the EPA’s conclusions was challenged
in 2015 by its independent scientific advisory panel which asserted that
the study minimized the risks posed to drinking water by fracking.57 The
2004 EPA’s report, which reached the conclusion that fracking “posed
little or no threat” to drinking water resources, was deemed flawed after
establishing conflicts of interest among the majority of the sevenmember Peer Review Panel.58 As a result, an investigation into the

52

Id.
Sheila Jasanoff, Relating Risk Assessment and Risk Management, 19 EPA J. 35, 35
(1993).
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Curtis Morrison, Fracker in the Rye: The Necessity of Federal Fracking Waste
Regulation and a Fracking Waste Regulatory Commission, 37 WHITTIER L. REV. 87, 102
(2015); see also About, CHESAPEAKE ENERGY, (Aug. 24, 2020, 4:08 PM)
http://www.chk.com/about.
57
Id.
58
M. Burger see supra note 10, at 1519.
53

10
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impact of political influence on the study was commenced by the EPA
Inspector General.59
In 2010 an EPA study on the potential for fracking to contaminate
the drinking-water supplies began.60 Although completion of the study
was intended for 2014, it was not concluded until 2016.61 Great attention
was placed on this EPA study because it was aimed to confirm or refute
the 2004 EPA’s conclusions, which found “no conclusive evidence”
showing that fracking has impacts on drinking-water.62 During that time,
President Obama openly praised fracking, considering it the reason
behind achieving the US energy independence, the growth of the
economy, and bringing down the levels of greenhouse gases.63 It is
noteworthy that in 2013, the US became the world's largest oil and gas
producer, thereby reducing imports to levels unseen in over a decade.64
Within the same context, the president of the US Chamber of Commerce
expressly warned that the EPA study on drinking water “could shortcircuit America’s absolute explosion in energy opportunity that is
creating millions of jobs.”65 Such excessive attention to the 2014 EPA
study raised an enormous amount of criticism.66 Such focus on the study
was deemed as “enormous political pressure,” interfering with the risk
assessment neutrality, and undermining future credibility in risk
assessment.67
c. Risk assessment conducted in an environment of scarce data
Lax fracking regulations are at the origin of fracking-data gaps and
absence of reporting requirements. Risk assessment tools (e.g. predictive
models) have purposefully been omitted in statutes and regulations
governing fracking activities.68 Predictive models are one of the risk59

Id.
The politics of fracking, THIS WEEK (Aug. 24, 2020),
https://theweek.com/articles/451472/politics-fracking;
61
Id.; see also U.S. EPA. HYDRAULIC FRACTURING FOR OIL AND GAS: IMPACTS FROM THE
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING WATER CYCLE ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES IN THE UNITED
STATES (FINAL REPORT). U.S. EPA, supra note 46.
62
See supra section II. A “The Federal Oversight.”
63
See The politics of fracking, supra note 61.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
M. Burger supra note 10, at 1533.
67
Id.
68
“Rather than using their statutory authority to evaluate potential environmental impacts
from shale gas extraction proposals, most states’ permitting of oil and gas development
have stuck to a traditional role: require minimum well construction standards setbacks, and
a process from groundwater supply replacement. This approach differs dramatically from
60

11
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assessment tools used to measure any potential harm that might be
caused by the fracking operations.69 Predictive models also allow
permitting authorities (risk management authorities) to play a risk
assessment role at an early stage of the fracking process, i.e. as early as
the permitting stage.70 Simply put, the predictive model-based approach
ensures that a scientific assessment of potential risks and the operation
outcomes be predicted at the early stage of permitting, before the
inception of the operations.71 As a result, the predictive models are
deemed to be the best analytical devices available for regulatory agencies
to evaluate potential impacts of a proposed activity during the permitting
process.72
Additionally, collection of baseline data gathered before drilling can
provide evidence about whether methane in nearby groundwater
originates from drilling or is already present beforehand.73 In this
context, under the Illinois’ Hydraulic Fracking Regulatory Act, fracking
operators are bound to undertake baseline water sampling before
engaging in any fracking activities.74 Consequently, in light of collected
data, permitting authorities would make well-informed decisions as to
whether and under what conditions to issue fracking-related permits.75
The EPA’s Progress Report and the 2016 final report on its Study of
the Potential Impacts of Hydraulic Fracturing on Drinking Water
Resources confirm that these models are available for use in shale gas
development permitting.76
Last but not least, by absolving fracking operators of disclosure
obligation, trade secrets laws impede access to important fracking data
such as fracking fluids’ chemical composition.77
the predictive model -based approach of permitting underground injection control wells,”
see Emily A. Collins, Permitting Shale Gas Development, 29 J. LAND USE & ENV’T. L. 117,
118 (2013).
69
Id. at 119.
70
Id. at 126.
71
Id.
72
“[…] the state agencies have not incorporated necessary information gathering into their
permitting rules and processes to use predictive modeling, which is the best evidence, in
deciding whether, and under what conditions, to issue a gas development permit,” Id. at
143.
73
K. Watson, supra note 30, at 357.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 142.
76
See 2016 EPA Study, supra note 46.
77
“Currently, there is no federal law regulating fracking. Instead, fracking is only regulated
under state law. Public disclosure requirements vary widely from state-to-state. Some states
have no disclosure requirements at all. Of the states that do, most have included trade secret
exception provisions allowing oil and gas companies to refuse to disclose the chemicals
12
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d. Assessed fracking risks
There are environmental risks associated with any oil and gas
production sites. However, there are some additional risks specifically
associated with shale gas fracking operations. This paper focuses
essentially on fracking operations’ impacts on water resources.
One of the unique features of fracking operations is the
transportation, storage, and use of significant quantities of water.78 Risk
assessment studies revealed the potential risk of groundwater
contamination due to fracking fluids’ underground injection throughout
the hydraulic fracturing process.79 To store the fracking fluids, operators
generally use “the purpose-built ponds or ‘frack tanks’ set at the drilling
location.”80 The natural formation pressure causes a large quantity of the
fracking fluids injected into the wells to return to the surface, which is
known as “flow-back water.”81 Said flow-back water is also stored in
frack tanks or purpose-built ponds at the drilling site.82 These ponds pose
risks of environmental damage both at short and long terms.83 For
instance, a storm may cause the contamination of nearby land and water
sources if the concentration of additives is sufficiently high in the stored
flow-back waters.84 Shallow aquifers, soils, and shallow groundwater are
also at the danger of slow releases emanating from the ponds.85 Another
risk consists in the likelihood of releases from the vertical casings86 of
these wells, impacting shallow aquifers with either fracking fluid or
recovered methane.87
they use in fracking. More importantly, very few state laws that have trade secret
exceptions also require that the company provide any substantiation that the trade secret is
legitimate. Without some kind of uniform factual substantiation requirement, what is to
keep oil and gas companies from abusing trade secret exceptions?” See Melanie
McCormick, Conflicting Theories at Play: Chemical Disclosure and Trade Secrets in the
New Federal Fracking Regulation, 9 GOLDEN GATE U. ENV’T. L. J. 217, 218 (2016).
78
Thomas Swartz, Hydraulic Fracturing: Risks and Risk Management, 26 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T 30, 30 (2011).
79
See H. Wiseman, supra note 34, at 137-38, 184.
80
T. Swartz see supra note 79, at 31.
81
Id. at 30
82
Id.
83
Id. at 31.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
“Typical well construction includes the use of numerous casings, starting with the largest
“conductor casing” used to stabilize the shallow soils while drilling the well. The next
casing is the surface casing used to establish a seal between the borehole and the shallow
formations, which may include shallow and freshwater aquifers,” Id.
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One additional risk to the shallow aquifers occurs during the
completion of the wells.88 This is when the fracking process opens up
new fractures that would communicate with existing fractures in the
overburden, allowing the communication between the deep gas-bearing
zone and the shallow drinking-water aquifers.89
Another significant risk consists of the loss of “flow-back” water
from the production site.90 Said flow-back water includes fracking
chemicals of undetermined and unknown toxicity.91 Surrounding
farmlands, homesteads, and waterways are particularly vulnerable to this
risk.92 Similarly, a blowout of a drilling pad would dangerously impact
the life of a community particularly if the drilling operations are
occurring in the outskirts of an urban area.93
The significance of the above-listed risks stresses the need for
appropriate risk management tools.
2. Risk Management
Risk management is defined as the process by which the risk
assessment “is used with other information to make regulatory
decisions.”94 In general, risk management is premised upon studies of
technological feasibility costs, and on the economic and social
consequences (e.g. employment impacts) of possible regulatory
decisions.95 The outcome of the risk assessment coupled with other
relevant information to risk management are looked at together for
purposes of making risk management options and environmental
decisions.96
Before critically appraising fracking-related risk management in the
US, there is a need to determine how risk management and risk
assessment relate.

88

Id.
Id.; see also D. Spence, supra note 5, at 151.
90
See T. Swartz, supra note 79, at 31.
91
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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See D. Patton, supra note 32, at 11.
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a. Relating risk management to risk assessment
Risk assessors base their judgment on facts that are believed most
approximate to the “reality.”97 The question that arises here is whether
the facts of the risk should be assumed independently from the risk
management considerations or have to derive somehow from the
concerns of the risk management. The answer to this question depends
on how conservatively the policy makers are inclined to draw up their
policies to protect public health and the environment.98 For instance, do
the policy makers want to eliminate the risks that are unacceptably high
for some subpopulations or only to reduce those that occur at too high
frequency for the entire population? Should risk assessment default
assumptions be set to protect individuals that are the utmost exposed,
highly vulnerable, or most normal?
As a result of such complexity in making risk management decisions,
US states’ policies have varied drastically. For instance, within the
fracking regulation context, states such as New York99 and Vermont100
have adopted a statewide outright ban on fracking, while other states like
Texas101 and Pennsylvania102 opted for more flexible fracking regulations
and enforcement.
The ultimate objective of any risk manager, with respect to shale gas
fracking, is striking a balance between regulating in a way that allows all
stakeholders (i.e. industry, states, and communities) to reap the benefits
of shale gas, on one hand, and minimizing the potential for
environmental degradation on the other.103

97

S. Jasanoff, see supra note 54, at 36.
Id.
99
See D. Spence, supra note 5, at 159.
100
Id. at 143.
101
“In no instance in its [Texas’] rules or application to drill does Texas require
information that would allow the Rail Commission to model the potential for substance
migration of fluids or methane from gas development operations,” see E. Collins, supra
note 69, at 132; Texas, like Pennsylvania provides no formal predrilling water testing
requirement. Nathan Richardson, Madeline Gottlieb, Alan Krupnick & Hannah Wiseman,
The State of State Shale Gas Regulation, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE (2013),
https://media.rff.org/documents/RFF-Rpt-StateofStateRegs_Report.pdf.
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“Pennsylvania’s gas development permitting process does not actively provide room
for reviewing agency to evaluate and address subsurface migration of gas and
contaminants prior to development,” see E. Collins, supra note 69, at 137; For instance,
RFF survey cites Pennsylvania among states that do not formally require predrilling
water testing before drilling or hydraulic fracturing, see RFF report, Id. at 30.
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Hannah J. Wiseman, Risk and Response in Fracturing Policy, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 729,
738 (2013).
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b. Critical appraisal of fracking risk management solutions
As fracking industry-derived political and economic benefits are
undeniable, risk management responses tend in large to (i) accommodate
these non-environmental competing policy goals. Due to the inherent
uncertainty attached to risk assessment, risk managers are stepping in to
overcome such (ii) lack of certainty.
i.

Accommodation of non-environmental competing policy
goals

There is a tough balance to be struck between handling suspected
adverse effects of fracking on the environment and its spillover benefits
with respect to the economy and society. Fracking has been praised for
contributing to the US energy independence, creating new jobs, and
reducing greenhouse gas emissions.104
Shale gas, extracted in the US, using fracking technology, has been
presented as a viable economic alternative source of energy toward
achieving a degree of energy independence.105 Interestingly, thanks to
shale gas, the US has been leading the global production of natural gas
after bypassing Russia in 2009.106 President Obama reportedly called
Pennsylvania the “Saudi Arabia of natural gas” because of the state’s
shale resource and its potential to enhance US energy independence.107
At a national level, the extraction of shale gas has been perceived as a
means to pursue the US paramount interest of energy security and
independence, putting an end to a longstanding US dependence on the
Middle East’s energy supplies.108
Additionally, while as of 2012, the shale gas industry has reportedly
been the source of 2.1 million jobs, the number is likely to attain 3.3
million by 2020.109 An $85 billion reduction in the US annual trade
deficit is attributable to shrinking oil and gas imports.110
104

See The politics of fracking, supra note 61.
Id.
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R. Reser, see supra note 29, at 91.
107
“‘We are the Saudi Arabia of natural gas,’ the president said Tuesday,” Eric
Schwartzel, Obama’s Backing of Shale Gas Aimed at Voters in Marcellus Region,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Jan. 29, 2012), https://www.postgazette.com/home/2012/01/29/Obama-s-backing-of-shale-gas-aimed-at-voters-inMarcellus-region/stories/201201290240.
108
Id.; See also Clarissa Bierstedt, What’s the Fracking Problem? Hydraulic Fracturing,
Silica Sand, and Issues of Regulation, 63 DRAKE L. 639, 643 (2015).
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110
Id.
105

16

Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2020

17

Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 2
Washington Journal of Environmental Law and Policy

At a state level, in Texas, for instance, “oil and gas is big business”,
as the state’s production of natural gas amounts to “one-fourth of the
nation’s natural gas.”111 “The oil and gas industry alone accounts for
14.9% of the state’s gross product, and nearly 312,000 people have jobs
in the oil and gas industry.”112
Such remarkable political and economic benefits derived from the
fracking industry have further complicated the mission of risk managers,
striving to strike a balance between environmental and public health
concerns, as well as other competing interests. Risk managers must
account for concerns that legislative and regulatory developments may
fall behind the increasingly important economic role of shale gas.113
From another perspective, risk management responses to the fracking
potential risks should also be perceived through the lens of industrial
interests. Governments do not engage in direct investment in, or
production of, energy; rather, governments try to induce private capital to
make such investment through regulations (including subsidies) that
would raise or lower the profitability of the production of given fuels.114
Therefore, industrial interests tend to lobby policymakers to relax
energy-related regulations for economic reasons.115
The decision whether to permit or prohibit shale gas production must
overcome the temptation of focusing exclusively on the most immediate
impacts drawn from a cost-benefit analysis. Equal importance should
rather be accorded to broader impacts of the shale production so that all
costs and benefits are weighed, and more widely distributed, in the
longer run.116
That said, it bears noting that a cost-benefit analysis is a prevalent
technique, almost systematically used by policymakers, in crafting risk
management decisions. Proponents of the cost-benefit analysis hold that
the analysis presents numerous advantages.117 First, it offers economic
justifications for preconceived regulations, promotes economic
efficiency, and eliminates “unnecessary and wasteful public and private
expenditures.”118 Second, cost-benefit analysis contributes to diminishing
111

K. Watson see supra note 30, at 358.
Id.
113
Id.
114
D. Spence see supra note 5, at 169.
115
“States also could be inefficiently captured by industry, which benefits from revolving
door connections to state regulatory bodies and has lobbied heavily against federal
fracturing regulation.” see H. Wiseman, supra note 104, at 814.
116
D. Spence see supra note 5, at 169.
117
Jeremy D. Frailberg & Michael J. Trebilcock, Risk Regulation: Technocratic and
Democratic Tools for Regulatory Reform, 43 MCGILL, L. J. 835, 858 (1998).
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interest-group pressures on regulation by ensuring that the regulations
are not shrouded in mystery, but are instead made accessible to the lay
public.119 Nonetheless, cost-benefit analysis presents a number of limits.
The efficiency of this analysis is contingent on its ability to accurately
value both costs and benefits of regulating or not regulating involved
potential risks.120 A fundamental objection to this approach is its attempt
to place a dollar value on morally and intellectually invaluable things,
such as human life or harms to the environment (as it does not seem
moral to place a value judgment on preserving endangered species or
natural history).121
Within the context of shale gas development, potential water
resource contamination and threats to drinking water depletion due to
fracking’s excessive use of water pose sheer valuation problems. For
instance, no one can put a price on the availability of clean drinking
water at home. People rely on clean and plentiful water resources to meet
their basic needs, including drinking, bathing, and cooking. The 2010
documentary “Gasland” eloquently illustrated the magnitude of fracking
impacts on drinking waters.122 In a particularly notable scene, a husband
and wife were able to ignite the water running from their kitchen faucet
because of water methane contamination resulting from the alleged
fracking chemicals leaking into drinking water aquifers.123 Discussing
the cost-benefit analysis role in shaping fracking related risk
management decisions is beyond the scope of this paper, however, it
seems fair in light of the foregoing to say that the analysis raises serious
criticisms with respect to its valuation techniques and strategies.124
This paper also argues that the regulatory process should be
safeguarded from undesirable interference by granting risk assessment
analysis a priority over interest groups’ pressure. Environmentalists
express concerns as to the risk management process’s vulnerability and
susceptibility to overlook risk assessment determinations falling for
involved industry’s pressure.125 For instance, in the 1980’s, the EPA’s
Office of Pesticides and Toxic Substances “exempted formaldehyde from
designations as a priority chemical under section 4(f) of the Toxic
Substances Control Act, even though risk assessors’ conclusions
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definitively proved that this substance causes cancer in rats.”126 The risk
management measures seemed to have been unduly influenced by the
concerns of the formaldehyde industry.127 Within the shale gas context,
this instance resembles the US Vice President Dick Cheney’s leadership
of a taskforce which exempted Halliburton Company, of which he was
the former CEO, from fracking wastewater disposal under the Safe
Drinking Water Act. Such regulatory moves are now known as the
“Halliburton Loophole.”128 The resulting regulatory vacuum at the
federal level has generated inconsistent state regulatory regimes, in
which only a fraction of states endeavor to resolve fracking fluid disposal
issues. As a result, “a variable regulatory terrain” has been created with
“many significant gaps unfilled.”129
ii.

Fracking risk management uncertainty

There is a difference between risk and uncertainty. Risk indicates
that the likelihood of possible future events is known and defined.
Uncertainty, on the other hand, signifies that the likelihood of a future
event has not been or cannot be measured.130
As previously discussed, fracking impacts on water resources fall
within those situations where risk assessment is inconsistent and
uncertain. Where risk assessment uncertainty exists, policy judgments
are necessary to fill in the gaps.131 Therefore, risk managers are called to
adopt the best policies to deal optimally with uncertainty. When
addressing uncertainty, regulators not only have to determine its
parameters, but also the impacts of any assumption adopted to deal with
the uncertainty on the society, economy, and the environment.132
When uncertainty is inevitable, certain risk managers tend to adopt
conservative risk assessment assumptions thereby leading to
conservative risk-management decisions.133 It is noteworthy that the
choice to be conservative in risk assessment is ultimately a risk
management judgement.134
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Additionally, risk managers may resort to conservative positions
irrespective of any risk assessment assumptions. This can be exemplified
in the fracking risk management context, by the statewide outright
fracking bans adopted by a number of states, such as New York and
Vermont, as they were faced with insufficient knowledge about fracking
impacts on the environment.
Risk assessment conclusions as to whether or not fracking is safe are
neither conclusive, nor provide us with facts about the probability of
occurrence of certain accidents under certain conditions. The decision
that determines the level of acceptable risk – the probability of water
contamination – is still beyond the scope of risk assessment and belongs
more properly to the domain of risk management.135
The subsequent section explores the level of conservatism for which
the regulatory authorities opted, in crafting fracking risk management
policies, taking into account fracking risk assessment uncertainty.
II. FRACKING RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT AT THE FEDERAL
AND STATE LEVELS
This section analyzes fracking risk management tools at the federal
and state levels. It further addresses the extent to which risk management
and risk assessment should optimally interact in furtherance of water
resource protection from fracking potential threats. Despite the fact that
risk assessment remains inconclusive as to fracking’s potential impacts
on water resources, fracking risk management is exempted from most
federal laws and regulations. This has led to the emergence of a spectrum
of inconsistent state laws and regulations, which range from a laissezfaire approach to outright statewide bans on fracking.
A.

The Federal Oversight

1. Historical overview of fracking-risk assessment at the
federal level
The 1980 Amendment to the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA) exempted several types of solid wastes from regulation as
hazardous wastes, including “drilling fluids, produced waters, and other

135

See generally H. Wiseman, see supra note 34; See also Wiseman alluded to the state of
New York stating that New York’s position toward shale gas activities relied on
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wastes associated with the exploration, development, or production of
crude oil or natural gas or geothermal energy.”136
Section 8002(m) of the amendment requires EPA to study these
wastes and to submit a final report to Congress.137 The EPA conducted
and submitted a report in December 1987, known as the 1987 report. The
report also addressed the “adverse effects of such wastes on humans,
water, air, health, welfare, and natural resources […].”138
The report recommendations were not confined to whether Congress
ought to continue with the application of RCRA Subtitle C to exempted
wastes or uphold the current exemption; rather, the report analyzed the
risks posed by the improper management of oil, gas, and geothermal
wastes, which may adversely affect and cause damage to public health or
the environment.139 It bears pointing out that the report was of general
scope and not specifically designated to evaluate risks generated by
fracking wastes.
Additionally, the EPA acknowledged the limits of the 1987 report
conclusions due to a lack of data necessary for risk modeling and risk
assumptions.140 The report recognizes that “the limited amount of waste
sampling data and the lack of empirical evidence on the probability of
injection well failures have made it impossible to estimate precisely the
absolute nationwide or regional risks from current waste
management.”141
It is important to note that comprehensive information on the
exempted wastes from oil and gas operations is not routinely collected
nationwide. Rather, the information relied upon in the report was

136

See 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(2)(A)—(B) (1982); see also OFF. OF SOLID WASTE AND
EMERGENCY RESPONSE, EPA/530-SW-88-003, REPORT CONGRESS: MANAGEMENT OF
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=1&TocRestrict=n&Toc=&TocEntry=&QField=&QFieldYear=&QFieldMonth=&QFiel
dDay=&IntQFieldOp=0&ExtQFieldOp=0&XmlQuery=&File=D%3A%5Czyfiles%5CIn
dex%20Data%5C86thru90%5CTxt%5C00000002%5C2000ESA8.txt&User=ANONYM
OUS&Password=anonymous&SortMethod=h%7C&MaximumDocuments=1&FuzzyDegree=0&ImageQuality=r75g8/r75g8/x150y150g16/i
425&Display=hpfr&DefSeekPage=x&SearchBack=ZyActionL&Back=ZyActionS&Bac
kDesc=Results%20page&MaximumPages=1&ZyEntry=1&SeekPage=x&ZyPURL.
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collected by the American Petroleum Institute (API) and the injection,
production, and hauling reports conducted by state agencies.142
In the guise of a general conclusion, the report states:
For the vast majority of model scenarios evaluated in this
study, only very small to negligible risks would be
expected to occur even if the toxic chemical(s) of concern
were of relatively high concentration in the wastes and
there was a release into ground water as was assumed in
this analysis. Nonetheless, the model results also show
that there are realistic combinations of measured chemical
concentrations . . . and release scenarios that could be of
substantial concern. EPA cautions that there are other
release modes not considered in this analysis that
could also contribute to risks. Also there are almost
certainly toxic contaminants in the large unsampled
population of reserve pits and produced fluids that could
exceed concentration levels measured in the relatively
small number of waste samples analyzed by EPA.143
With respect to risks associated with produced water disposal in
injection wells, the report concluded that the prevalent risks for
underground injection stem from either grout seal or well casing
failures.144 However, the report recognized that “other possible release
pathways such as migration through unplugged boreholes or fractures in
confining layers, . . . could be of concern.”145
The 1987 report recommended that “the imposition of RCRA
Subtitle C regulation for all oil and gas exploration, development, and
production wastes to be unnecessary” and “impractical.”146 First,
“unnecessary” because damages and risks posed by oil and gas
operations result from violations of existing State and Federal
regulations. According to the EPA, the enhancement of existing
authorities, the improvement of the state programs, and existing Federal
initiatives relating to underground injection and surface water risks, are
adequately designed to manage oil and gas wastes.147
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Second, “impractical” because of the substantial (possibly 22%)
reduction in gas and oil production in the US should Subtitle C
regulations be enforced.148 The 1987 report was relied upon to exempt
the oil and gas exploration and development wastes from RCRA Subtitle
C. This remains applicable to the fracking waste and will be further
discussed in the ensuing section.
In the early 2000’s, in response to public concerns about potential
impacts on the drinking water from shale gas fracking, Congress directed
the EPA to study the relationship between fracking oil and gas and
drinking water in the U.S.149 In 2004, the EPA undertook a study that
assessed the potential for contamination of underground sources of
drinking waters (USDW)150 from the injection of hydraulic fracturing
fluids into coalbed methane (CBM) wells.151
The 2004 study was limited at least in two respects. First, although
the study alluded to steps in the fracking other than fracking wastewater
injection that can contaminate the underground drinking water, it fails to
fully analyze these stages.152 Second, the study analysis was limited to
CBM wells and did not include other hydraulic fracturing practices, such
as those for petroleum oil and gas.153
The 2004 study found that there is “no conclusive evidence that
water quality degradation in USDWs is a direct result of injection of
hydraulic fracturing fluids into CBM wells and subsequent underground
movement of these fluids.”154 Interestingly, the 2004 study was criticized
for using existing data and not undertaking further investigations, and
hence missing out on the opportunity to conduct an independent risk
assessment study rather than merely building its conclusions upon
existing literature.155
The conclusions of the 2004 study underpinned the 2005
Amendment of the Safe Water Drinking Act (SWDA), which exempted
148
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151
See 2004 EPA Study, supra note 43.
152
See F. Gradijan, supra note 151, at 53.
153
Id.
154
See 2004 EPA study, supra note 43, at 25.
155
See F. Gradijan, supra note 151, at 54.
149

23

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol11/iss1/2

24

Abid: Reflection on Shale Gas Fracking Risk Assessment and Management i
Washington Journal of Environmental Law and Policy

the fracking fluids underground injection from the scope of the federal
UIC program under SWDA. This point will be further addressed with
more details in a subsequent section.
In 2010, due to the controversy that surrounded the 2004 study, the
EPA began planning a study of the fracking water cycle to understand
how different activities affect the quality or quantity of drinking water
resources and to identify factors that affect the frequency or severity of
those impacts.156 The EPA rendered the final report in 2016 (hereinafter
“the 2016 report”).157
The 2016 report concluded that groundwater resources are
vulnerable to a combination of activities and factors in the fracking water
cycle.158 These activities and factors include:
1) water withdrawals for hydraulic fracturing in times or
areas of low water availability, particularly in areas with
limited or declining groundwater resources; 2) spills
during the management of hydraulic fracking fluids and
chemicals or produced water that result in large volumes
or high concentrations of chemicals reaching groundwater
resources; 3) injection of hydraulic fluids into wells with
inadequate mechanical integrity, allowing gases or liquids
to move to groundwater resources, and; 4) injection of
hydraulic fracturing fluids directly into groundwater to
surface water resources and disposal or storage of
hydraulic fracturing wastewater in unlined pits, resulting
in contamination of groundwater resources.159
The report concedes that further conclusions regarding the impacts of
fracking on drinking water could not be reached owing to data gaps and
uncertainties.160
Particularly, data gaps existed with regard to the environmental
presence and movement of fracking chemicals. The report suggested that
such gaps may be bridged by standardizing the currently rare practice of
obtaining water quality data both before and after engaging in
fracking.161
156
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These data limitations precluded the EPA from being conclusive in
determining whether or not fracking activities adversely affect drinking
water resources.162 It is worth noting that data gaps and lack of relevant
monitoring figures are essentially due to regulatory loopholes, which
omit to require such pre, post, and during fracking water testing. 163
Requirements for provisions of fracking data as well as fracking fluid
chemicals disclosure will be further discussed in the ensuing sections.
The report called for additional efforts to bridge the data gaps and
increase risk assessment certainty with regard to the prevalence and
volume of drinking water impacts.164
Before suggesting a number of solutions to remedy these
shortcomings preventing the elaboration of more certain and complete
fracking risk assessment, the ensuing sections discuss the current legal
and regulatory status quo, both at the federal and state levels,
highlighting to a greater extent the origin of fracking-related data gaps to
which the report pointed.
2. Fracking-risk management at the federal level
Because this paper mainly focuses on threats posed by the fracking
operations to water resources (surface and underground), this section
examines the major pieces of federal legislation designed to regulate
hydraulic fracturing effects on water resources.
Similar to conventional oil and gas, the exploration and production
of shale gas is regulated by a complex set of federal, state, and local
laws.165 At the federal level, the EPA takes on the responsibility of
administering the federal laws. At the state level one or more regulatory
agencies issue well related permits covering various aspects like “design,
location, spacing, operation, and abandonment, in addition to
environmental activities and discharges, including water management
and disposal, waste management and disposal, air emissions,
underground injection, wildlife impacts, surface disturbance, and worker
health and safety.”166
The federal legislative arsenal related to shale gas development and
water resources protection include 1) the Safe Drinking Water Act
162
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(SDWA) which addresses the subsurface fluid injections; 2) the Clean
Water Act (CWA) which deals with the surface water discharges; 3) the
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability
Act (CERCLA) which provides for the cleanup of historic contamination
by hazardous substances; 4) the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA) which sets forth federal standards for the management of
hazardous wastes from the stage of generation to the disposal; 5) the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) which mandates a
comprehensive assessment of the environmental effects of shale gas
extraction on federal land, and; 6) The Emergency Planning and
Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA) which facilitates and ensures
access to information and statistics in order to foster a positive feedback
mechanism that allows the exercise of greater pressure on local or central
government to enforce existing regulations.167
a. Safe Drinking Water Act
The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) was enacted in 1974, with
“its ‘general purpose to assure that water supply systems serving the
public meet minimum national standards for protection of public
health.’”168 The SDWA regulates the underground injection activities
with the goal of “protect[ing] groundwater resources, including
underground drinking-water supplies.”169
Under the SDWA, the EPA oversees at the federal level the safety of
the groundwater resources through the Underground Injection Control
(UIC) permit program.170
As far as the hydraulic fracturing is concerned, in 1997, a Federal
Court171 interpreted the SDWA as applicable to “underground injection
of fracking fluids.”172 Under the SDWA, the EPA undertakes a
“minimum inspection, monitoring, record keeping and reporting
requirements for state Underground Injection Control (UIC)

167

Id. at 579, 582, 585.; “…Congress enacted EPCRA as a comprehensive regime requiring
companies to disclose information related to the storage and use of hazardous and toxic
chemicals,” see Burger, supra note 10, at 1521.
168
M. Burger see supra note 10, at 1503.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 1504.
171
See Legal Env’t Assistance Foundation v. EPA, 118 F.3d 1467, 1478 (11th Circuit
1997).
172
D. Callies & C. Stone, Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing, 1 J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 11
(2014).
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programs.”173 All underground injections are prohibited unless exempted
or permitted.174
In the event a state chooses to take control of the enforcement of the
UIC programs, it may apply to the EPA to be granted statutory
responsibilities.175 “Once approved, states are primarily responsible for
issuing injection permits and monitoring the effect of injections on the
quality of” the underground water resources.176 A state seeking EPA
approval must develop a UIC program which safeguards drinking water
from any potential dangers due to injections, as well as guarantees of
sufficient oversight measures.177 Failure to secure the approval of a state
UIC program or in the event of incompetent management, federal control
and management may step in.178
Consequently, under the ordinary and plain meaning of the SDWA
provisions, hydraulic fracturing would have come under the scope of the
statute. In other words, there is nothing in the ordinary and plain
language of the SDWA that supports the exclusion of hydraulic
fracturing. Thus, the state UIC programs would have made the issuance
of permits obligatory for the injection of fracking fluids.179 The “oil and
gas injection wells—including the so-called ‘enhanced recovery’ wells
like fracking wells—are regulated under the federal UIC program’s Class
II requirements.”180 In Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation, Inc.
v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, the Eleventh Circuit
rejected the EPA’s interpretation, which argued that the “underground
injection” did not include hydraulic fracturing operations.181 The
Eleventh Circuit held that SDWA required the regulation of hydraulic
fracturing alongside the traditional underground injection forms.182
In 2005, Congress passed the Energy Policy Act (EPAct), which
carved out the operations associated with the shale gas exploration and
extraction from the scope of the SDWA.183 The EPAct “amended the
definition of ‘underground injection’” to “exclude ‘the underground
injection of fluids or propping agents’” associated with the hydraulic

173

Id.
Id. at 12.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 11–12.
178
Id. at 12–13.
179
See M. Burger, supra note 10, at 1504.
180
Id.
181
Legal Env’t. Assistance Found., Inc. v. EPA, 118 F.3d 1467, 1478 (11th Cir.1997)..
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Id. at 1477–1478.
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M. Burger see supra note 10, at 1504.
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fracturing operations.184 Pursuant to the exclusion, only injection of
diesel requires a prior UIC permit.185 The EPAct also indicates that the
regulatory framework governing fracking activities would from then on
fall within the state permitting and enforcement structures.186 As a result,
unless the gas drillers inject diesel fuel underground, “they are not
required to seek a permit, or to disclose any of the chemicals in their
fracking fluid under federal law.”187
The UIC permitting under SDWA relies on predictive models in
determining the endangerment standard, which yields a risk-based
evaluation of a proposed operation during the permitting process.188 The
outcome of the evaluation would give rise to one of the following
decisions: 1) a prohibition of the activity without a permit, or 2)
establishment of a standard for permit issuance that requires the applicant
to demonstrate that the underground injection will not endanger drinking
water sources.189
The SDWA was envisioned to “foster a ‘cooperative effort in which
the Federal government assists, reinforces, and sets standards for the
State and local efforts’ in implementing the Act.’”190 Nonetheless, the
exemption of injection of the fracking fluids from the scope of the
SDWA enabled the individual states to assume the enforcement of their
own UIC programs.191 As it will be addressed in further detail in the
ensuing section, the states’ UIC programs generally do not restate the
SDWA endangerment standard.192
The absence of “a federal floor of minimal regulation in permitting
shale gas extraction” fueled the debate over whether states should be
trusted with the environmental management and control.193
State oil and gas development statutes are infused with broad
language that leaves sufficient room for state agencies to promulgate
necessary rules to prevent any undesired environmental impacts of the
shale gas extraction.194 Yet, more often than not the state agencies fail to

184

Id.
Id.
186
See E. Collins, supra note 69, at 117.
187
Thomas Hooker, Zoning Out Fracking: Zoning Authority under New York State’s Oil,
Gas and Solution Mining Law, 40 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 869, 876 (2012).
188
See E. Collins, supra note 69, at 125-126.
189
Id. at 125; see also 42 U.S.C. §300h(b)(1)(A) (2013) and 42 U.S.C. §300h(b)(1)(B).
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Id. at 128.
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Id.
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See infra section II. 2.
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See Emily A. Collins, supra note 69, at 118.
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Id. at 126.
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put in use the discretion they were granted.195 In fact, unlike the SDWA,
with the exception of Illinois’s statute, no state has an oil and gas statute
at the permit application phase that “(1) clearly puts the burden on the
applicant to show that their proposed operation is safe, or (2) describes
the level of acceptable risk of contamination of water supplies.”196
The fracking fluids’ exemption from the scope of the SDWA has
been criticized as “bad environmental policy.”197 For instance,
EarthWorks contented that the exemption makes “oil and gas the only
industry allowed to inject toxic fluids directly into good quality
groundwater without oversight by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency.”198
As mentioned above,199 this exemption has been referred to as the
“Halliburton Loophole” given that it “was pushed through Congress by
Vice President Dick Cheney, a former chief executive of [Halliburton, a
multinational oil and gas company].”200 Knowing that fracking was
invented by Halliburton in 1947, critics insinuate that EPA would have
not abdicated the authority of regulating fracking activities to the states
“but for inappropriate interference of corporate interests.”201
b. Clean Water Act
The Clean Water Act (CWA) governs “unpermitted discharges of
soil, chemicals or other materials to wetlands or surface waters.”202
“Since 1987, drilling operations have been exempted from storm water
runoff provisions of the CWA.”203 Additionally, a CWA amendment
made fluids generated by the hydraulic fracturing fall outside the scope
of the “pollutant” category: “the term ‘pollutant’ . . . does not mean . . .
(B) water, gas, or other material which is injected into a well to facilitate
production of oil or gas.”204 As a result, the CWA only comes into play
195

Id.
Id.
197
Matt Willie, Hydraulic Fracturing and Spotty Regulation: Why the Federal Government
Should Let States Control Unconventional Onshore Drilling, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1743,
1761 (2011).
198
See Wiseman, supra note 35, at 145 n.156 (quoting EARTHWORKS, OIL & GAS
ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING, available
at http:// www.earthworksaction.org/pubs/Fracking.pdf).
199
See discussion supra I.2.b.i.
200
See C. Bierstedt, supra note 110, at 659.
201
Id.
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See D. Callies & C. Stone, supra note 174, at 21.
203
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Id.; See also 33 U.S.C § 1362(6).
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to regulate the disposal of fracking “flowback or fracking wastewater,”
other than the underground injection.205
In Texas, similar to many other states, the “fracking wastewater is
disposed of primarily by injection into underground storage wells below
impermeable rock layers.”206 Consequently, because the CWA
essentially regulates “discharge at the surface level, instead of
underground injections of fluids, [it] has not historically played a large
role in the regulation of oil and gas operations” in some geographical
areas.207 Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that certain geological formations,
including the Marcellus Shale region, are not appropriate for
underground disposal, which may explain the existence of fewer
injection wells in that region.208 As a result, treatment of fracking
operation flow-back water in publicly owned treatment works (POTW) is
“more common.”209 This makes the provisions of the CWA of greater
relevance within certain geographical areas when compared with others.
Put differently, the CWA’s applicability to fracking fluids disposal
depends on the geological characteristics of the shale gas formations at
issue, which in turn vary widely across states and jurisdictions.
The CWA endows the EPA with the power to set wastewater
standards for industries as part of pollution control programs.210 “They
have also set water quality standards for a variety of contaminants in
surface waters.”211 The CWA provides that the discharge of a pollutant
into the water of the U.S. requires a permit from either the EPA or the
authorized state agency, and that the discharge is in compliance with the
CWA-based National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES).212
“Shale gas production sites or commercial facilities [taking on the
responsibility of handling the] ‘disposal or treatment of shale gas
produced water must obtain permits if they intend to discharge directly
into the surface waters.’”213 Also, the CWA provides that indirect
disposal of fracking wastewater through POTW by discharging directly
into waters in the US falls within the jurisdiction of the EPA.214
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See D. Callies & C. Stone, supra note 174, at 21.
R. Reser, supra note 29, at n. 18.
207
D. Callies & C. Stone, supra note 174, at 21.
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R. Reser, supra note 29, at n. 18.
209
Id.
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Adams et al., supra note 7, at 580 (citing 33. U.S.C. §1251).
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Granting a NPDES permit, either by the EPA or an authorized state
agency, requires the consideration of technology-based effluent limits
and the water quality-based effluent limits.215 In sum, “states are
generally delegated primary enforcement authority with regards to the
CWA, following the EPA’s approval of the state program.”216
c. Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act
CERCLA “is a retrospective law designed to provide for the cleanup
of historic contamination by hazardous substances.”217 CERCLA
provides for the creation of a ‘Superfund’ with the goal of financing
“government remedial actions.”218
Under CERCLA, contaminated sites can be cleaned up either by
state or federal government authorities, or responsible private parties
(either voluntarily or under a government order).219 Under CERCLA,
federal and state governments and certain private parties can bring claims
against “potentially responsible parties” (PRPs) on the grounds of their
release of hazardous substances.220 Section 104 (e) of the statute
empowers the EPA “to investigate the site and any alleged PRP” in the
event of identification of a contamination site.221 Subsequent to the
investigation, the EPA is authorized under section 106 to order PRPs to
undertake certain remedial actions.222 However, CERCLA turns to be of
little relevance to fracking waste management since in defining
“hazardous substance” for establishing a potential PRP’s liability,
CERCLA excludes “petroleum, including crude oil, . . . natural gas,
215

R. Reser, supra note 29, at 98-99; see also Adams et al., supra note 7, at 580-81
(“Effluent limitations serve as the primary mechanism under NPDES permits for
controlling discharges of pollutants to receiving water. When developing effluent
limitations for an NPDES permit, a permit writer must consider limits based on both the
technology available to control the pollutants (i.e. technology-based effluent standards)
and the regulations that protect the water quality standards of the receiving water (i.e.
water quality-based effluent standards). The intent of technology-based effluent limits in
NPDES permits is to require treatment of effluent concentrations to less than a maximum
allowable standard for point source discharge to the specific surface water body. This is
based on available treatment technologies, while allowing the discharger to use any
available control technique to meet the limits.”).
216
R. Reser, supra note 29, at 98.
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Id. at 99.
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[and] natural gas liquids.”223 This exemption is of particular importance
to the oil and gas industry.224
From another vantage point, because the hydraulic fracturing fluids
may include other substances than the ones exempted, CERCLA
empowers the EPA to issue remedial orders, instructing operators to
redress contamination associated with the fracking fluids.225
d. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
The provisions of subtitle C of RCRA sets forth “the federal
standards for the management of hazardous [solid] wastes” from the
stage of generation to disposal.226 The RCRA establishes stringent
safeguards and waste management procedures in regulating hazardous
solid wastes.227
Under the RCRA, the EPA may entrust the execution and
enforcement of hazardous solid waste regulations with the states only
when the state programs meet the federal regulations level of
stringency.228 The stated overarching goals driving the enactment of the
RCRA were essentially to ensure that:
(1) It provides uniformity among the states as to how
hazardous wastes are regulated. (2) It provides industry
and commercial establishments that generate such wastes
uniformity among states, (3) by providing such
uniformity a state with environmentally sound laws does
not drive business out of the state to a state which, for
economic reasons, decides to be a dumping ground for
hazardous programs equivalent to the federal program,
the police power of the states that are [sic] utilized rather
than the creation of another federal bureaucracy to
implement this act.229
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Id.
Id.
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Id. (“Following an investigation, CERCLA section 106 authorizes the EPA to order a
PRP to undertake certain remedial actions.”).
226
M. Burger supra note 10, at 1521.
227
R. Reser, supra note 29, at 99.
228
M. Burger supra note 10, at 1522–23.
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H.R. REP. NO. 94-1491, at 30, reprinted in 1 ENV'T &
NAT. RES. POL’Y DIV., CONG. RSCH. SERV., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL ACT, AS AMENDED, TOGETHER WITH A SECTION-BYSECTION INDEX 585, 558, 591 (COMM. PRINT 1991).
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In 1980, Congress temporarily exempted wastes from the oil and gas
exploration and production from the RCRA’s federal hazardous waste
regulation until the EPA determined later whether to include said
wastes.230 Such a decision was justified by the fact that allegedly some of
the EPA regulations governing drilling fluids, produced waters, and other
oil and gas exploration and production wastes “could have a significant
economic impact” on the industry, and further information on the degree
of risk and the efficiency of existing state and federal programs was
required.231
In 1988, based on the EPA 1987 report,232 the agency recommended
that the federal regulation of oil and gas exploration and production
wastes under the RCRA was unnecessary.233 Therefore, the EPA has
never listed fracking waste as “hazardous waste.”234 The position taken
by the EPA “was premised on its finding that alternative regulations
were infeasible, state regulations were adequate, and the economic harm
suffered by the oil and gas industry would be severe.”235
As a result, even though the fracking fluids include toxic chemicals,
which would normally be regulated by the RCRA, the fracking operation
wastes fall outside the scope of the statute.236
In 2010, several environmental groups represented by the Natural
Resource Defense Council requested the EPA regulate hazardous waste
created by exploring and producing oil and gas.237 Additionally, the
petition demonstrated that fracking produces hazardous waste and that
there are significant gaps in existing state regulatory regimes that
necessitate federal intervention to fulfill the statute’s purposes238
e. National Environmental Policy Act
NEPA’s general purpose is to set forth national goals for the
protection, maintenance, and enhancement of the environment.239 Within
230

M. Burger supra note 10, at 1523.
Id.
232
Id.
233
Id.
234
C. Morrison, supra note 57, at 100.
235
M. Burger supra note 10, at 1523.
236
R. Reser, supra note 29, at 99.
237
M. Burger supra note 10, at 1525.
238
Id. (RCRA’s overarching concerns–providing nationwide protection from hazardous
wastes and promoting uniformity among the states–would best be served by rescinding the
regulatory exemption).
239
“The purposes of this Act are: To declare a national policy which will encourage
productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environmental; to promote
efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and
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the context of shale gas operations, NEPA imposes “a thorough
environmental impact analysis” for activities taking place on federal
land.240
NEPA provides for three levels of environmental risk assessment
requirements: 1) activities that fit within a categorical exclusion enjoy a
low level of review or risk assessment requirements due to these
activities’ insignificant impact on the environment; 2) an environmental
assessment is required when there is a need to determine whether an
activity necessitates an environmental impact statement; and, 3) an
environmental impact statement, which is a comprehensive risk
assessment tool that provides alternative actions, addresses unavoidable
effects, and suggests other stringent requirements.241
Strikingly, the EPAct (2005) exempted certain oil and gas activities
from stringent environmental review under NEPA.242 Also the EPAct
specified that the oil and gas related activities, including fracking, fall
within the categorical exclusion standard, which is the lowest level of
scrutiny required by NEPA and does not allow public comment.243 In line
with EPAct policy, the US Bureau of Land Management exempted oil
and gas companies who lease federal lands from the environmental
impact statement.244
f.

The Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act

The public’s access to information and statistics leading to rising,
informed, public awareness and greater pressure on relevant authorities
may play a major role in improving the enforcement of environmental
laws and existing regulations.245
These transparency measures can contribute to filling data gaps in
connection with the oil and gas industry in general and with respect
fracking activities specifically.246
stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological
systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on
Environmental Quality.” National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91190, § 2, 83 Stat. 852 (1970).
240
Adams et al., supra note 7, at 579.
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Paolo D. Farah & Riccardo Tremolada, A comparison between Shale Gas in China and
Unconventional Fuel Development in the United States: Water, Environmental Protection,
and Sustainable Development, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 579, 622 (2016).
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Id. at 623.
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Passed in 1986, the EPCRA was intended to urge information
disclosure with the goal of facilitating both decision makers and the
public’s access to relevant data, in addition to motivating fracking
operators to diminish or stop hazardous or toxic chemicals’ release.247
Under this statute, companies are under the obligation to file annual
reports on the amounts of toxics released into the environment, or else
recycled, treated, or disposed of in landfills.248 The reports are accessible
online through the database called the Toxic Releases Inventory (TRI).249
The TRI is a searchable database maintained by the EPA, to inform and
guide policy decisions of local communities and federal government
about the toxic releases and waste-management activities.250
The statute only provides for the facilities in the manufacturing
sector to file the reports with TRI; however, the EPA has the authority to
add additional industry sectors at its discretion to the statutory list. 251
Similar to chemicals utilized in other oil and gas activities, the chemical
composition of fracking fluids is carved out from the scope of EPCRA.252
Hence, U.S. Shale gas companies are not required by federal law to
disclose the chemicals being used for hydraulic fracturing.253
In 2012, a number of environmental groups led an initiative, known
as the “Environmental Integrity Project” calling the EPA to place the oil
and gas extraction industry on the list of those entities obligated to
disclose toxic releases under the TRI.254Among the elements that the
EPA should weigh is whether disclosure by facilities within the oil and
gas industry will increase the amount of information available or
“otherwise further the purposes of [the] EPCRA.”255 In examining this
factor, the EPA’s TRI analysis asks whether existing state and voluntary
information disclosure rules provide adequate information to satisfy the
EPCRA’s purpose.256
Interestingly, eleven states where fracking operations are occurring
have not adopted disclosure requirements, while the other half require
drilling companies to reveal some, but not all chemicals used for

247

M. Burger supra note 10, at 1526.
Sheldon Leigh Jeter, The Role of Risk Assessment, Risk Management, and Risk
Communication in Environmental Law, 4 S.C. ENVTL. L. J. 25, 46 (1995).
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Jeter, supra note 250, at 46.
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fracking.257 However, it is worth stressing that, Congress did not
expressly exclude fracking from the scope of the EPCRA. In fact, it is a
matter of proper implementation of the EPCRA. Simply put, it is up to
the EPA to add the fracking industry to the TRI.258
Within the same context, it bears pointing out that there is no federal
law or regulation that governs the disclosure of the chemical ingredients
added to the fracturing fluids.259 The composition of fracturing fluids
differs according to the characteristics and nature of the formation at
issue; in general, the fluid contains mostly water, proppants (e.g. sand to keep the fractures open), and a small percentage of chemical
additives.260
Some of these additives have been characterized as “hazardous to
health and the environment.”261 For instance, the Shale Gas Production
Subcommittee of the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board “has
recommended public disclosure of all of the chemical ingredients added
to the fracturing fluids,” while according a certain degree of protection to
trade secrets.262
However, there are 15 states that enacted chemical disclosure laws,
half of which require direct public disclosure of chemical information on
the FracFocus chemical disclosure website.263 Few states give the
disclosing parties a choice of either submitting the information to a
publicly-accessible website comparable to FracFocus or to a state
agency.264 Additionally, the disclosure’s timing and level of the detail
vary from state to state. While a number of states impose the submission
of material safety data sheets (MSDSs) for certain chemicals, the level of
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P. Farah & R. Tremolada, supra note 247, at 623.
M. Burger supra note 10, at 1529.
259
R. Reser, supra note 29, at 99.
260
Id. at 93, 101.
261
Id. at 101–02.
262
Id. at 102.
263
R. Reser, supra note 29, at 102 (State regulations which require disclosure of chemical
information on the FracFocus chemical disclosure website include: The Code of
Colorado Regulations (Colo. Code Regs. §404-1:205A(b)(2)), North Dakota
Administrative Code (N.D. Admin. Code 43-02-03-27.1(1)(g), (2)(h)), Texas
Administrative Code (Texas Admin. Code §3.29(c)(2)(A))); see also BRANDON J.
MURRILL, CONG. RES. SERV., HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: CHEMICAL DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS 5 (2012), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42461.pdf.
264
Louisiana Administrative Code provides that the operator must make disclosures to
the state agency or “furnish a statement signifying that the required information has been
submitted” to the FracFocus site or a comparable registry, so long as “all information is
accessible to the public free of charge.” see LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, § 118(C)(1), (C)(4);
see also B. MURRILL, supra note 263, at 5.
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disclosure remains low.265 A number of state laws provide that “at least
some disclosure of information about fracturing fluid chemical
composition be disclosed” before fracturing takes place.266 It is worth
noting that such requirements of disclosure of fluid chemical
composition before fracturing rather than afterward turns out to be of
limited usefulness.267 This is because the chemical mixtures of the
fracturing fluids are adjusted as the process progresses.268 As a result, the
disclosures provided before the fracturing stage “may not accurately
reflect the actual chemicals that will be used.”269
The disclosure of the chemicals’ identities before and after the
fracturing operations helps establish the chemicals baseline present in the
water prior and after the gas extraction activities.270 By comparing the
“baseline testing results” before the start of the operations with the
results from post-fracking operations, an eventual “groundwater
contamination” as well as its potential source will undoubtedly be
detected with greater certainty.271 From another perspective, in case of a
spill or release, the prior knowledge of the fracking fluids chemicals
would facilitate the mission of responding to and containing the
emergency.272
B.

A Spectrum of Inconsistent State Fracking Approaches: From
“Laissez Faire” to Outright Statewide Bans

It follows from the above section that the federal government
currently exempts most fracking activity from regulation and thus states
are free to regulate practices as they see fit.273 For this reason the bulk of
fracking regulation has been crafted at the state level. There currently
exists a patchwork of state regulations, where each state enacts various
265

R. Reser, supra note 29, at 102.
Id.; Kentucky requires some disclosure at the permitting phase (805 KY. ADMIN.
REGS.1:110 (2008)); see also Jeremy. I. Maynard, Fracking the Oil and Gas Trade
Secrets of the Marcellus Shale Natural Gas Play, 6 KY. J. EQUINE AGRIC. & NAT.
RESOURCES L. 161, 174 (2013).
267
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Id. at 104 (citing AM. PETROLEUM INST., HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OPERATIONS
WELL CONSTRUCTION AND INTEGRITY GUIDELINES §10.2 (2009), http://www.api.org//media/Files/Policy/Exploration/APIHFl.ashx). For more information on this
issue, see MARY TIEMANN & ADAM VANN, CONG. RES. SERV., NO. R41760, HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING AND SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT ISSUES (2015).
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requirements for wastewater disposal, underground injection, water
supply acquisition, drilling, casing and operating wells.274 The various
state fracking regulations fall along a spectrum from outright statewide
bans to a laissez-faire approach.275 This panoply is best exemplified by
New York, Illinois, and Texas’ fracking-related regulations. While New
York is currently enforcing a statewide fracking ban, Texas has a longstanding fracking-friendly regulation, and Illinois stands in the middle of
these two extremes by having enacted one of the most comprehensive
regulatory frameworks governing almost all aspects of fracking. 276
This section explores first (1) arguments advanced for trusting the
states with regulating shale fracking operations, then turns to a (2)
detailed analysis of the fracking regulations in the three chosen states.
1. Arguments for trusting states with undertaking fracking risk
assessment and management
Proponents of “spotty” fracking regulation at the state level advance
a number of arguments in support of such a stance.277 First,
commentators on this side of the debate argue that more local and
specialized regulation is better. This is primarily because the fracking
technology is almost always geologic and region specific.278 Thus,
additional federal regulation becomes unnecessary and potentially
problematic if it conflicts with state controls.279 Opponents of reestablishment of a federal oversight on fracking activities argue that the
states already provide for extensive environmental protections. They
further consider that establishing a uniform system at a federal level
would not only paralyze the state-centric system (which, they claim, has
been working for decades without remarkable issues), but also creates
overlapping controls, slowing down domestic oil and gas production in
addition to generating a one size-fits-all technological solution to fields
of diversified geological characteristics.280 Additionally, it has been
argued that the state officials are generally better equipped and more
informed about local and regional production techniques than federal
regulators.281
274
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Many also give the example that Congress struggled to craft
effective mining legislation, despite the widespread expansion of
national environmental protections throughout the last century because
the geological and regional differences encouraged a state-centric
regulatory scheme.282 Such argument is advocated to be equally pertinent
to the oil and gas industry.283 Decentralization adopts risk-management
tools that are tailored more narrowly to specific local risk assessment
data and more responsive to particular geographical environmental
conditions.284
In line with these thoughts, commentators argue that fracking
operations are either benign or hazardous depending on the shale
formation.285 Thus, the stringency of fracking regulation should vary
according to the shale location and characteristics.286 Therefore, it is
argued that the fracking risk management decisions ought to be left to
state policymakers and state regulatory agencies, who are better placed to
take into account the importance of the geological dissimilarities
between shale formations.287
Furthermore, as a result of the wide variety of geologic and regional
specificities, the fracking fluids vary by field and formation.288 For
instance, fracking operators in Montana have been reportedly using
“mostly gel water sand frac[k], with the gel consisting of a drilling mud
or polymer.”289 However, reports show that the fracking wastewater
generated at the Pennsylvania’s Marcellus Shale is unexpectedly highly
rich in radiation.290
Political accountability is another reason to favor state regulation
because federal regulators are presumably less sensitive to local concerns
mainly because bureaucrats reside far away from the shale gas
formations subject of their federal directives.291 It is strongly argued that
decentralization generates decisions that are more democratic and more
responsive to local preferences.292
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Additional rationales may corroborate the rhetoric opting for
decentralization of fracking regulations. Numerous states may act as
“laboratories of democracy” or experimentation to enhance innovation
and creativity in resolving fracking-related issues.293 Decentralization
might encourage inter-jurisdictional competition, which can lead to
economically efficient regulation or even “a race to the top.”294
In the section below, the analysis of fracking regulations in three
different jurisdictions demonstrates that the current state-centric system
is replete with shortcomings. State approaches towards fracking varied
dramatically from an outright statewide ban to a relaxed regulatory
framework.295 These approaches range from unnecessarily stringent
regulations to regulations replete with regulatory gaps. Additionally, the
various state approaches fail to promote the collection of fracking related
data needed for more certain fracking risk assessment studies, and thus
more informed risk management decisions.296
2. Comparative analysis of state fracking regulations
This section explores fracking legal and regulatory frameworks in
three states in the US, namely (a) New York, (b) Texas, and (c) Illinois.
Each of these three states falls at a different position of the
aforementioned spectrum, ranging from “laissez faire” (Texas) to
outright statewide ban of fracking activities (New York).
a. New York
The Marcellus Shale in the State of New York is deemed as “one the
largest shale formations in the country.”297 The type of natural gas found
in this formation is thermogenic gas.298 It was determined that drilling
vertical wells (i.e. conventional drilling method) into these formations
was not an economically viable choice. 299 Thus, advanced technology
(i.e. horizontal drilling) was needed to render the development of shale
gas cost-effective.300
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In 2009, the US Geological Survey assessed the Marcellus Shale at
84 trillion cubic feet of undiscovered, technically recoverable natural
gas.301 Other estimations consider the Marcellus Shale as the second
largest volume of captured natural gas in the world and that it holds 489
trillion cubic feet of natural gas.302 It is noteworthy that “the total annual
rate of gas consumption in the US is only 25.5 trillion cubic feet.”303
New York Governor David Peterson imposed a statewide
moratorium on fracking in December 2010.304 At the outset, it is worth
précising the difference in meaning among the terms used such as
moratorium, ban, and legal or executive moratorium or ban. A
moratorium refers to a temporary suspension of a specific activity,
whereas a ban imposes a general prohibition by legal means.305 A
moratorium by law, or ban by law, is ban or moratorium that is approved
by the legislature, whereas political ban or political moratorium is
established by the executive branch.306
Fracking activities became one of the hottest political, legal,
environmental, and commercial debates throughout New York State due
to rising public concerns about the immense amount of water needed
which must be disposed of, the little knowledge available about
chemicals used for fracking, and the impacts of these factors on water
resources.307 The proximity of the Marcellus Shale to the New York City
and Syracuse Watersheds ignited public concerns that the fracking fluids
injected into wells would contaminate drinking water.308
In July 2008, Governor Paterson directed the NY Department of
Environmental Conservation (DEC) to update its 1992 Generic
Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS) which governs oil and gas
drilling in New York State (known as the supplemental GEIS, or
SGEIS).309 In September 2009, a draft of the SGEIS was released for
301
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public comments.310 The draft included that the “DEC found no
substantive basis to believe that water quality [would] be degraded in the
New York City watershed or any other watershed or aquifer.”311
Before the DEC issued its final SGEIS, the New York legislature
passed a bill in November 2010 placing a moratorium on all vertical and
horizontal hydro-fracking until 2011.312 Governor Paterson vetoed this
bill for being “too broad” and for its potential to “halt hundreds of
existing, productive vertical fracturing operations that were supporting
many hundreds of jobs in New York.”313 Notwithstanding his previous
position, the Governor later signed Executive Order No. 41, which
instructed further environmental investigation on the issue of fracking
and “prohibited the DEC from issuing permits for hydraulic fracking
activities until completion of the SGEIS and the elaboration of a
regulatory regime specifically designed for such projects.”314
Importantly even when Governor Cuomo took office in January
2011, his predecessor’s executive order remained in effect.315 In June
2012, the DEC was considering permitting fracking activities only in five
counties in the Southern Tier of New York. Confining fracking activities
to these areas would have limited fracking operations to the deepest areas
of the Marcellus Shale rock formation.316 This would have been
undertaken in an effort to reduce potential risks of groundwater
contamination.
The final GEIS of June 2015 eventually provided for a statewide ban
on high volume hydraulic fracturing (HVHF) across New York state.317
It was revealed later on that keeping fracking operations out of
specifically mapped environmentally sensitive areas would reportedly
have effectively prevented fracking above 63% of the Marcellus Shale
(the number of wells would be limited to fifty statewide).318 Accordingly,
a partial ban was deemed justifiable from a cost-benefit perspective. The
limitation would result in “limited economic and social benefits that
would be derived from High Volume Hydraulic Fracturing” and hence,
310
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“the No-Action alternative [was] the only reasonable alternative
consistent with social, economic and other essential considerations.”319
Interestingly, the New York DEC relied on a cost-benefit analysis, rather
than risk assessment analysis, to depart from geographically-limited
fracking operations.320
It is also worth highlighting that the final Supplemental GEIS banned
only High-Volume Hydraulic Fracturing, which uses “300,000 or more
gallons of water as the base fluid for hydraulic fracturing for all stages in
a well completion,” not any other type of fracking that uses less quantity
of water.321
b. Texas
As shale gas fracking is booming in Texas, fracking-related
“regulation and enforcement appear to be lagging behind.”322 Texas’
fracking laws and regulations illustrate the shortcomings of allocating
primary regulatory authority to the states, without a federal regulatory
floor.323 In Texas, this has resulted in an alarming legislative and
regulatory void with respect to water resources protection.324
i.

Texas’ deficient UIC program

In the UIC context, Texas Natural Resources Code provides that the
well construction standards and practices allow the evaluation of harms
threatening water supplies.325 The state agency (Texas Railroad
Commission) is also empowered to impose other requirements to curtail
adverse environmental impacts on ground and surface water.326
In this context, Texas’ statute provides:
To prevent pollution of surface water or subsurface water
in the state, the commission shall adopt and enforce rules
319
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and orders and may issue permits relating to: 1) the
drilling of exploratory wells and oil and gas wells or any
purpose in connection with them, 2) the production of oil
and gas . . . The commission shall adopt rules to establish
groundwater protection requirements for operations that
are within the jurisdiction of the commission, including
requirements relating to the depth of surface casing for
wells.327
At the outset, the statute uses a permissive language, suggesting that the
agency “may issue permits,” hence it is not obliged to undertake any risk
analysis to protect groundwater. The statute also merely requires uniform
rules for every gas drilling and production, overlooking the specificity of
fracking operations.328
Furthermore, the statute fails to provide minimum standards for
ensuring the protection of groundwater. In this sense, Texas’ statute does
not provide for specific conditions related to protection of groundwater
which would result in the denial of a permit in the event of noncompliance.329 Texas’ rules and drilling applications do not require any
additional information that allows the agency to restrict drilling and
operations if a predictive model shows that water contamination may
occur at a specific location.330
Moreover, the drilling application fails to include a clause that allows
the Railroad Commission to obtain information necessary to model the
potential for subsurface migration of fluids or methane from gas
development operations.331 This casts real doubts as to whether the
current regulations assure the conduction of adequate risk assessment
associated with the drilling operations.
Texas’ statute focuses more on well construction rules to ensure
protection of groundwater. Nonetheless, the statute fails to expressly and
clearly require the state to evaluate risks associated with the
contemplated fracking operations prior to issuing a permit.
Texas agency’s regulations and drilling application do not require the
provision of any additional fracturing data, despite the breadth of the role
attributed to the agency on protecting groundwater under Texas statute’s
language. This data is extremely important for the agency to deny
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drilling and operations if a predictive model shows that adverse
environmental impacts are imminent.332
ii.

Failure to regulate the use of potable groundwater for
shale gas fracking activities

Chapter 36 of the Texas Water Code exempts the use of potable
groundwater for an oil and gas exploration permit.333 This exemption
means that fracking operators are allowed “to drill as many water wells
as they want and use as much fresh groundwater as they need with few
restrictions or guidelines.”334 No permit is required for pumping fresh
groundwater so long as this water is used for oil and gas activities.335
Strangely enough, a permit is only required when fracking operators use
brackish water.336 The Railroad Commission issued only 33 of such
permits in 2012.337
iii.

Shortcomings of Texas’ chemical disclosure law: Texas
House Bill 33228

In 2011, Texas enacted the House Bill 3328, which required
operators of fracking activities to disclose the chemical composition of
their fracking fluids.338 Nonetheless, the statute includes an exception for
chemicals classified as trade secrets. 339 Therefore, the Texas Railroad
Commission must determine a process for fracking operators to
“withhold and declare certain information as a trade secret.”340
Additionally, the chemical disclosure requirement provision does not
apply retroactively, hence, the fracking operations that commenced
before February 1, 2012, are not subject to the disclosure requirement.341
Therefore, “hundreds of thousands of pre-existing drilling operations are
332
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not required to disclose the components of the fracking fluid used in their
well” regardless of whether or not the chemicals are trade secrets.342
Texas HB 3328 presents a number of deficiencies. The Bill initially
required the approval of the Railroad Commission in order for an
operator to obtain trade secret exemption from the disclosure
requirement.343 However, the final enacted version omitted the upfront
requirement for the Commission’s approval of the trade secret claim.344
Rather, the enacted statute directed the Commission to prescribe a
process whereby an operator can claim the components are a trade
secret.345 The Commission did not prescribe a process that scrutinizes the
credibility of an operator’s claim for trade secret protection; rather, the
Commission prescribed a process that lists limitations applicable to
potential challengers of an operator’s trade secret claim.346 In other
words, an operator does not need the approval of the commission to take
advantage of the trade secret exemption from the disclosure requirement
under HB 3328, whereas a challenger to the trade secret protection must
comply with a number of conditions, including: 1) a 2-year statute of
limitations, and 2) the challenger must be the landowner, an adjacent
landowner, or a government agency.347 No authority is tasked with
overseeing operators in respect of the requirements for trade secret
claims, while restrictions are imposed on the challengers.348
Additionally, the Commission would request an operator “to
substantiate its trade secret protection claim only after a challenge to the
claim has been asserted.”349 Simply put, the fracking operators are not
required to proffer evidence in order to claim trade secret protection;
rather, evidence is only requested when the claim is challenged.350
Hence, Texas HB 3328 offers fracking operators the opportunity to
easily circumvent the disclosure requirements.351 Such regulatory
relaxation is concerning as it encourages a significant number of
exemptions to be claimed (in 2012, one year from the enactment of the
disclosure law, fracking operators claimed 10,000 exemptions).352
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Furthermore, even the operations that are subject to the disclosure
requirement must comply with such obligation after the completion of
the fracking.353 As a result, the fracking chemicals are disclosed only
after having been used. Environmentalists and the public may
understandably question the purpose of such a disclosure requirement, as
the supposed damage may have already been done.354
c. Illinois
Commentators who are in favor of allocating fracking regulatory
authority to the states often advance the state of Illinois as illustrative of
the ability of states to adopt fracking regulations that make better sense
and suit the needs of its citizens.355 This is because, in 2013, Illinois
passed “a major comprehensive statute to regulate fracking,” the
Hydraulic Fracturing Regulatory Act (HFRA).356 The HFRA has been
deemed so far “the nation’s strictest regulations for natural gas
drilling.”357
In fact, the HFRA imposes a number of restrictive requirements on
fracking operators, notably: a high volume horizontal hydraulic
fracturing permit is required for each fracking well developed;358 all
chemicals anticipated to be added to or used as hydraulic fracturing fluid
must be disclosed in the permit application as well as its concentration
and “mass;”359 each application for a permit requires a plan for the
handling, storage, transportation, disposal, or reuse of the fluids, together
with a traffic management, containment, and plugging and restoration
plan;360 and water quality monitoring of all water sources likely to be
affected by the process of fracking.361 In addition to the drilling permit
required by the Oil and Gas Act, a specific permit for horizontal
hydraulic fracturing is also required;362 “fracking operations will be
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conducted in a manner that will protect the public health and safety and
prevent pollution or diminution of any water source.”363
It is worth stressing that, under the HFRA, the burden falls upon the
permit applicant to show the safety of the shale gas development
operations to the state agency.364 Thus, the high volume horizontal
hydraulic fracturing operations must at no time pose a threat to public
health, safety, or the environment.365 This requirement is “completely
unique to Illinois.”366
In the UIC context, the Illinois Oil and Gas Act charged Illinois’
Natural Resources Department with requiring:
The drilling casing and plugging of wells to be done in
such a manner as to prevent the migration of oil or gas
from one stratum to another; to prevent the intrusion of
water into oil, gas or coal strata; [and] to prevent the
pollution of fresh water supplies by oil, gas or salt
water.367
Illinois’ Oil and Gas Act requires developers to obtain a drilling
permit.368 It further requires that the application for permit provide for
the well location, the depth, and other information required by the
Department of Natural Resources.369
The HFRA added another layer of sophistication to Illinois’ UIC
program. Not only did the HFRA replicate many of the federal UIC
regulatory requirements, it added further provisions, notably in relation
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to “planning and evaluation . . . of proper use and management of water
supply quantities.”370
The HFRA sets forth with great specificity what an application for
UIC permit must include.371 Importantly, the state may deny an
application for a permit, if the applicant fails to submit satisfactory
information.372 The HFRA is clearly “an environmental permitting and
enforcement statute for shale gas development instead of a traditional
well location and construction statute.”373 This feature of the HFRA is
lacking in most oil and gas development statutes in the rest of the states.
III. SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This section suggests and explores solutions at both the structural
level and substantive level with the goal of enhancing fracking risk
assessment and management in the US.
A.

Structural Solutions to Enhance Fracking Risk Assessment and
Management

The structural solutions addressed in this section are three-fold: (1)
shared regulatory authority between federal and state level, (2) creation
of a national commission for fracking wastewater disposal, and (3)
establishment of one spot-shop for fracking permits.
1. Shared regulatory authority governing fracking activities
This subsection argues that a shared regulatory authority between the
federal government and the states would ensure a minimum federal
regulatory floor that would serve like a safety valve to protect water
resources from potential threats posed by hydraulic fracturing.
The controversy surrounding the risks posed by fracking operations
has been exacerbated because fracking has been exempt, as analyzed
above, in important ways from several federal environmental laws
including but not limited to the SDWA, the CWA, the RCRA, the
CERCLA, and the EPCRA.
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This analysis addresses the question of whether the assessment and
management of fracking risks should flow from a national or state level
and seeks to discern which level of governance is most appropriate by
considering the number of factors. This paper argues that the status quo
(the state-centric system) does not adequately deal with fracking’s
potential impacts on underground drinking-water supplies.
Many analysts advocate that fracking-related risk assessments and
risk management would be most effective if it came from the Congress
and the EPA rather than from a patchwork of state regulations.374 This
would arguably yield a certain consistency and visibility for the fracking
industry.375 Additionally, regulation at the federal level would “ensure
that the residents of every state are equally protected from any harmful
fracking effects.”376
There are essentially two conceptions of what represents an
appropriate sharing/division of regulatory authority, namely dual
federalism, and cooperative federalism.377
Dual federalism emphasizes the centrality of state autonomy. It
reflects relation of conflict between federal and state governments.378 It
views the federal government as one with limited purposes and
powers.379 Additionally, it maintains that the federal and the states “are
sovereign within their separate spheres.”380
Unlike dual federalism, which seeks to divide the US into exclusive
power domains, cooperative federalism, emphasizes partnership between
federal and state governments.381
The advocates of federal minimum oversight call for cooperative
federalism in dealing with fracking regulations. The cooperative
federalism emphasizes partnership between the federal government and
the states, rather than calling for dividing governance into exclusive
power domains between federal and state authorities.382 Cooperative
federalism maintains that states and the federal government often operate
in areas of overlapping authority and jurisdiction.383
Various arguments in favor of a minimum federal oversight are
noteworthy. First, fracking’s generation of “interstate externalities”
374
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makes a federal response crucial. 384 Second, federalization is likely to
solve “the problem of the ‘race to the bottom’” in which state and local
governments compete to give more concessions in order to attract
fracking companies.385 The federal uniformity in the regulation of
fracking activities provides economic efficiencies to the regulated
entities.386 Centralization can pool resources for gathering technical
information, generating reliable scientific knowledge, creating durable
rules, and enhancing enforcement.387 Centralization may also enable a
“different balance of interest group influence.”388 Lastly, federalization
can attenuate the “not in my backyard” attitude often evident in the
conflicts surrounding the siting of hazardous waste disposal sites and
other locally undesirable land uses.389
States should not be left as free riders in regulating fracking’s
impacts on water resources. For instance, states that are sensitive to
fracking waste risks may choose to ban fracking wastewater disposal
within their states, rather than banning fracking altogether. This policy
may lead to states lacking strong environmental regulations and proenvironment politicians in office being the dumping location of fracking
wastes, including wastewater transported from states with more stringent
fracking wastewater disposal regulations.390 This is illustrative of the
situations where the states become vulnerable to political influences of
the gas industry and economic forces, and compete among themselves to
adopt lax environmental regulations resulting in the “race to the bottom”
phenomenon.391 Additionally, the oil and gas industry lobby has
sigificant sway, especially in smaller state and local areas, making these
locations particularly susceptible to its relentless search for lower
fracking wastes disposal costs.392
In sum, with the proliferation of fracking activities across the US, the
risks of interstate pollution increase the need for a federal response.
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2. Creation of federal commission for fracking wastewater
disposal
Fracking lacks regulation in three main areas: 1) “oversight of and
accountability for onsite fracking processes,”393 2) oversight of fracking
fluid chemicals, which are often insulated from disclosure under
trademarks claims, and 3) monitoring fracking fluids storage and
disposal, including the underground injection of fracking wastewater in
underground wells.394
Therefore, the need seems crucial for the creation of a national
commission to regulate and enforce the laws governing fracking
wastewater disposal in the US. Observers propose that the commission
be named “Fracking Waste Disposal Regulatory Commission”
(FWDRC).395
To guarantee effective monitoring, it is recommended that the
Commission have regional headquarters with short distances from the
fracking sites.396
Another factor for the commission to attain its objectives is to
guarantee its neutrality. In fact, observers deem that the “most crucial
component of creating any new authority would be minimizing the risk
of agency capture, whereby those charged with regulating an industry
actually serve the interests of the industry.”397 The concept of agency
neutrality is of paramount importance because it deters manipulation of
the risk assessment and management processes.398
Scholarship deemed that agency capture stands behind the fact that
the “federal government’s leadership in fracking regulation has been
paralyzed.”399 Therefore, in order to efficiently address the frackingrelated risk assessment and management challenges, measures should be
taken to minimize agency capture. For instance, candidates for the
position of commissioner who previously worked for the oil and gas
industry, or owned interest in an oil and gas entity, should be restrained
from being appointed.400 Another less stringent proposal would suggest a
“cooling period” where the candidates for the position of commissioner
should not have worked for an oil or gas entity or have had oil and gas
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interests for the last ten years.401 Another measure consists of including a
non-compete clause in employment contracts, which would impede the
commissioner of seeking jobs in the oil and gas industry at the end of
their mandates with the commission.402
3. One-stop shop for fracking permits
One of the solutions to achieve more efficient risk analysis with
respect to authorizing fracking operations is “to create a ‘one-stop shop’
for federal fracking permits within the EPA or a state agency that has
been delegated to implement federal environmental statutes.”403 The
creation of such a body would help coordinate the permitting process
under the various applicable federal statutes and deriving regulatory
requirements, such as the CWA (for surface-level wastewater disposal),
SDWA (for underground injection of wastewater and underground
injection of fracking fluid that includes diesel fuel), and the TSCA (for
disclosure of chemical content), and any probable subsequent
requirement under RCRA, EPCRA, or CERCLA.404 The same body may
also grant permits necessary for underground injection of fracking fluids
in states that require a permit under their UIC programs, similar to UIC
programs under SDWA.405 Additionally, Congress may revoke the 2005
EPA Act’s exemption and bring UIC permitting into the same
consolidated process.406
B.

Substantive Solutions to Enhance Fracking Risk Assessment and
Management

The substantive solutions suggested in this subsection are three-fold:
(1) repealing fracking exemptions from most of federal environmental
statutes, (2) setting a federal floor of requisite fracking data at the
fracking permitting stage, and (3) imposing federal requirements for
fracking fluid chemical disclosures along the different process stages.
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1. Repealing fracking exemptions from federal environmental
statutes and regulations: SDWA, CWA, EPCRA, NEPA,
RCRA, CERCLA, EPCR
Crafting a fracking regulatory framework that strikes a balance
between the various competing interests appears to be the most adequate
solution. As analyzed above, a minimum federal oversight of fracking
activities is indispensable, and thus, the federal statutes should not be
exempting fracking activities from their scope. To the contrary, the
existing exemptions should be repealed and replaced with adequate
provisions that would efficiently govern the fracking activities.
For instance, Congress should repeal the exemption for fracking in
the SDWA by crafting a language that makes “underground injection of
fluids used for fracking” fall within the scope of “underground injection”
concept.407 Thus, fracking operators injecting fracking fluids in
underground wells, no matter where their operations are located, would
be subject the federal UIC’s Class II well requirements.
2. Federal requirement for provision of fracking-related data
At the outset, it is worth stressing that permitting schemes that do not
require needed information for informative risk assessment do more to
license harm than prevent it. Therefore, it is recommended that Congress
imposes the use of predictive models of underground contamination to be
incorporated into all states’ UIC permitting processes, to ensure fracking
operations’ compliance with these minimal federal standards.408
Furthermore, the imposition of baseline water testing and continual
water testing at regular intervals both during and after drilling is
recommended. Such practices would provide invaluable empirical data to
achieve an objective and more certain fracking risk assessment. Water
testing is not new and has been done in fracking studies, but the testing
requirement must be imposed by federal law, not left to state legislatures’
discretion. In fact, except for Illinois’ HAFRA where water testing is
required before and during fracking operations, water baseline and
interval testing is not required by any other state fracking regulation.409
Additionally, an independent third party must be conducting the
water testing to ensure the integrity of the results. Federal fracking
regulations can take a further step by imposing testing of the soil prior to,
during, and immediately after the fracking operations.
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If such federal fracking regulatory requirements are followed
nationwide, this would help monitor levels of contamination, if any
occurs, over the entire life cycle of the process. Additionally, it would
achieve greater credibility and certainty with respect to any conclusion
drawn.
3. Federal requirement for fracking fluid chemicals disclosure
In order to enhance transparency within shale gas exploration and
extraction operations, we propose that fracking operators be under the
obligation to timely and effectively disclose the composition of fracking
fluids used, including any chemicals mixed therein. The proposed
solution is two-fold. First, fracking operators will be under the obligation
to disclose the complete composition of the chemicals used in the
exploration and extraction operations. The disclosure must occur prior to
conducting any fracking operation and post completing the operations.
The level of detail of the disclosure and the timing are of paramount
importance to ensure that chemical disclosure obligation achieve its
goals. Therefore, this recommendation emphasizes the need for public
disclosure of all of the chemical ingredients added to fracking fluids, on
a well-by-well basis. Also, it is worth emphasizing that the disclosure
must take place prior to conducting any fracking operations and postcompletion of the fracking within a predetermined time frame, such as
within 30 days.
Second, trade secret protections must not strip the fracking chemical
disclosure obligation of its efficiency. The requirement for detailed
chemical disclosures may conflict with proprietary rights pertaining to
the chemicals used. Therefore, the trade secret protections should be
crafted and interpreted restrictively. Additionally, the Commission in
charge must prescribe a process to determine whether a fracking
operator’s claim for trade secret protections should be upheld.
Additionally, the process must make sure that any withheld information
associated with the chemical composition of fracking wastewater should
be conveyed to a third party (e.g. recyclers) acquiring the fracking
wastewater for purposes of disposal or treatment. The owner of the
fracking wastewater and the acquiring party, to whom the waste is
transferred, may enter into a non-disclosure agreement, confidentiality
agreement, or any other equivalent agreement. The agreement may
provide for a damages recovery remedy in the event of a breach of the
terms of confidentiality.
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CONCLUSION
Hydraulic fracturing will remain a hot button issue, and debates in
relation to this topic will continue to play out in federal and state
legislatures, agencies, courtrooms, and the front pages of newspapers.
The analysis of the current state-centric system regulating the shale
gas fracking reveals critical shortcomings and serious regulatory gaps,
which justify the rising calls for federal governmental intervention to
ensure, at a minimum, a federal fracking regulation floor.
A federal regulatory floor does not necessarily require preemption of
current state oil and gas statutes; rather, states will continue to enjoy
primacy over the environmental permitting and the various fracking
regulatory aspects. This paper simply advocates for a “cooperative
effort” in which the federal legal and regulatory arsenals assist, reinforce,
set minimum standards, and step in whenever state and local efforts seem
to be inadequate.
At a structural level, this paper recommends that fracking regulatory
authority ought to be shared by both the federal government and states; a
national commission for fracking waste disposal should be created; and a
one-stop shop to be established for the issuance of fracking operations
permits.
At a substantive level, this paper suggests that the exemption of
fracking activities from most of the federal statutes and regulations
dealing with water resources protection should be repealed. Additionally,
minimum federal obligations requiring fracking operators to provide
indispensable fracking data should be established, regardless of whether
or not they were required to do so under state and local regulations. This
solution brings a remedy to the fracking data gaps. The availability of
adequate fracking-related information contributes to greater certainty in
fracking risk assessment, which leads to more informed fracking risk
management policies.
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